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INVESTING IN SUSTAINABILITY: ETHICS GUIDELINES AND THE
NORWEGIAN SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND
DR. ANITA M. HALVORSSEN* AND CODY D. ELDREDGE**
I. INTRODUCTION
Companies that bring sustainability to the core of their business strategy,
often referred to as "socially responsible," are increasingly outperforming their
competitors over the long term.' The investment world is also gaining cognizance
of this and has begun focusing on environmental, social, and corporate governance
("ESG") issues, referred to as responsible investment. Responsible investors are
moving companies toward sustainable development by aligning investors'
2financial decisions with the companies' impacts on the environment and societies.
This integration process can also be referred to as internalizing the negative
externalities of production, in the broadest sense, both at home and abroad, thereby
eliminating those externalities altogether, or at a minimum incorporating
environmental and social costs into the cost of production. Unfortunately,
investors often overlook the link between environmental and financial returns,
especially if the focus is on short-term returns rather than long-term sustainability.
As a category of investors growing in prominence, sovereign wealth funds stand at
the intersection of sustainable investment and the desire to maximize financial
returns. Due to the sheer size of sovereign wealth funds as investors, it will be to
no small extent their responsibility to push companies to work toward mitigating
* Dr. Anita M. Halvorssen, LL.M., JSD, Adjunct Professor, University of Denver, Sturm College of
Law (amhalvorss@aol.com).
** Cody D. Eldredge, PhD Candidate University of Colorado, Department of Political Science
(cody.eldredge@colorado.edu).
1. What is Responsible Investment?, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV.,
http://www.unpri.org/what-is-ri (last visited July 20, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. PRI] (Principles for
Responsible Investment ("PRI") is a U.N. supported initiative). See also Robert G. Eccles, loannis
loanno & George Serafiem, The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes and
Performance 4 (Harvard Bus. School, Working Paper No. 12-035, 2013), available at
http://www.hbs.edulfaculty/Publication%20Files/12-035_a3cif5d8-452d-4b48-9a49-812424424cc2.pdf
(last visited July 20, 2014).
2. In this article, sustainable development, sustainability, and ethics and are used
interchangeably. Sustainable development, as defined by the Brundtland Commission (the U.N. World
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)), calls for economic "development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the needs of future generations." WORLD COMM'N ON
ENV'T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE, ch. 2 1 1 (1987), available at http://www.un-
documents.net/our-common-future.pdf [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE]. Sustainable development
is also described as an integrative principle, integrating economic with environmental and social
concerns. See Nico Schrijver & Friedl Weiss, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT xii-xiii (Nico Shcrijver & Friedl Weiss eds., 2004).
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these externalities, and in particular climate change, because their investment
decisions can have such a large influence on companies.3
This article will demonstrate that one particular investor, the Norwegian
Sovereign Wealth Fund, Government Pension Fund-Global ("GPFG"), has not
ignored the importance of integrating ESG issues into its investment decision-
making. The GPFG is the largest sovereign wealth fund ("SWF") in the world and
thus arguably one of the most influential investment funds.4 Since the introduction
of the Ethics Guidelines in 2004, the GPFG has prioritized sustainability within its
investment decision-making, and has in many ways been successful in that
endeavor.5 Given its successes in achieving high rates of return while facilitating
sustainable/ethical business practices among its investment recipients, the GPFG
should be regarded as a model for best practice for other institutional investors.
The work of the main entity mandated to implement the Ethics Guidelines, the
Council on Ethics, has been described as evolving into a "coherent jurisprudence
of ethics for corporate investment" using public power to influence private
governance among companies.6 Its recommendations have been followed closely
by other pension funds which have, in turn, also excluded the same companies
from their investment portfolio.7
The GPFG engages in responsible investing through two mechanisms: (1)
exercising the ownership rights granted to it through the securities it controls in
corporations (active ownership) to place firms on a path to sustainability, and (2)
observation and exclusion of companies from its investment portfolio when those
firms engage in unethical/unsustainable practices. The empirical analysis set out in
this paper focuses on the latter mechanism, highlighting the ways in which it is
routinely successful in motivating states to adopt sustainable business practices.
3. See Mitch Towner, Norway's Summit on Responsible Investing, 12 J. INV. MGMT. 33, 33-34
(2014) (referring to Christoph Loch's opening speech at the conference). Assets under management of
SWF amounts to over $6 trillion. Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, SWF INST.,
http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings (last visited July 20, 2014).
4. See Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, supra note 3.
5. See Guidelines for the Observation and Exclusion of Companies from the Government
Pension Fund Global's Investment Universe, REGJERINGEN.NO, § 2,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/styrer-rad-utvalg/ethics-councillethical-guidelines.html?id=425277
(last visited July 20, 2014) [hereinafter Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion]; Management
Mandate, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT, http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/govemance-
model/management-mandate/#Chapter2 (last visited July 20, 2014) [hereinafter NBIM Management
Mandate]. The Ministry of Finance adopted the new guidelines on March 1, 2010 pursuant to
Government Pension Fund Act. See MINISTRY OF FIN., MANAGEMENT MANDATE FOR THE
GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL 4, 25-26 (2010), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/FlN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/mandat spueng.pdf.
6. Larry Cath Backer, Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transnational Legislative Power:
The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets, 29 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1, 50 (2013).
7. See VICTOR LUND SHAMMAS, ETIKK I OLJEFONDET: - BARE BUTIKK OG UTENRIKSPOLITIKK?
[ETHICS IN THE OIL FUND: JUST BUSINESS AND FOREIGN POLICY?] 8 (2012), available at
http://www.academia.edu/3678322/Etikk i Oljefondet Rapport Changemaker (quoting Dag 0.
Hessen, member of the board of the Council on Ethics).
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To date, there has been little empirical analysis examining the effectiveness of
the GPFG in enforcing its Ethics Guidelines.8 We present evidence showing that
the Council on Ethics, under certain circumstances, is more successful at
influencing corporate behavior. Specifically, we show that the Council on Ethics
is more effective as the relative size of the investment in a given corporation
increases. This serves as a model for other institutional investors who may wish to
implement Ethics Guidelines targeting the behavior of corporations in their
investment portfolios.
Although the GPFG has succeeded in facilitating sustainable behavior while
contributing to the development of best practices for responsible investors, we also
suggest several reform proposals for improving the overall effectiveness of the
GPFG in implementing its Ethics Guidelines. The Norwegian Ministry of Finance
established the Strategy Council for the GPFG in the spring of 2013 in order to
review the work of the GPFG on responsible investment.9 Elements of its report,
"Responsible Investment and the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global,"
published last November, will be examined and other suggestions for change will
also be introduced. io The reform proposals include: expanding the grounds for
exclusion to include, among others, companies that produce energy from fossil
fuels, or at the very least energy production from coal and oil sands; granting the
Council on Ethics more autonomy; increasing the level of transparency in the
active ownership of the investment arm of the GPFG, including when entering into
dialogue with companies; and lastly, amending the mandate for the investment
arm, requiring it to fully consider the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises when managing
the companies currently within its investment portfolio, prioritizing companies for
assessment when they present a significant risk of actual or potential adverse
environmental or social impacts."
Part II introduces the GPFG, its legal framework, and the Council on Ethics
and its efforts at influencing the corporations in which it invests. Part III addresses
the interrelated questions about company compliance with the Ethics Guidelines
8. See ELROY DIMSON ET AL., RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT AND THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT
PENSION FUND GLOBAL 9-10 (2013), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/38525979/sc mainrreport.pdf; see also The Council on Ethics for the
GPFG, MINISTRY OF FIN., (June 24, 2013), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-
govemment-pension-fund/responsible-investments/the-council-on-ethics-for-the-
govemment.html?id=447010 [hereinafter The Council on Ethics for the GPFG]; infra note 52 and
accompanying text.
9. DIMSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
10. Id. at 3-4.
11. See e.g., NORWEGIAN NAT'L CONTACT POINT FOR THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINAT'L
ENTERS., FINAL STATEMENT: COMPLAINT FROM LOK SHAKTI ABHIYAN, KOREAN TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS WATCH, FAIR GREEN AND GLOBAL ALLIANCE AND FORUM FOR ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT VS. POSCO (SOUTH KOREA), ABP/APG (NETHERLANDS) AND NBIM (NORWAY) 45-48
(2013), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/36798927/nbim final2.pdf [hereinafter FINAL
STATEMENT: POSCO CASE].
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and what drives firm compliance with such guidelines. Part IV sets out the
sustainable pathway using the GPFG as a model for other institutional investors.
Part V introduces some reform proposals focusing on how to strengthen the
GPFG's responsible investment strategy. Part VI concludes with the observation
that the GPFG remains a solid model for other institutional investors, even more so
if it incorporates some of the reform proposals.
II. NORWAY'S SWF - GPFG1 2
A. Origins
Norway began exploiting its oil and gas reserves in 1971.' In 1990, the
Norwegian government established a sovereign wealth fund, first called the
Petroleum Fund, and later renamed the Government Pension Fund-Global. 14 The
goal of the GPFG is to use revenues from Norway's oil reserves without affecting
general income flow to the government, thereby buffering the impact of volatile oil
revenues on government spending.' 5  The fund also serves as an instrument for
long-term financial savings, ensuring that Norway's oil wealth benefits not just the
current generation, but also future generations, thereby fulfilling an important
ethical obligation1 6 in line with the principle of intergenerational equity.' 7  The
GPFG is also mandated to function as a responsible investor in fulfilling this
ethical obligation, exercising good corporate governance and promoting
sustainable development in economic, social, and environmental terms.' 8
12. See Anita Halvorssen, Addressing Climate Change Through the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth
Fund (SWF): Using Responsible Investments to Encourage Corporations to Take ESG Issues into
Account in Their Decision-Making, 8 INT'L & COMP. CORP. L.J. 1, 4-15 (2011) for background on
sustainable development and SWFs.
13. TORE ERIKSEN, NORWAY MINISTRY OF FIN., THE NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM SECTOR AND THE
GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL 3 (2006), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/TheNorwegianPetroleumSector-te.
pdf.
14. The Government Petroleum Fund, 22 June 1990, Act No. 36 §§ 1-2; The Government Pension
Fund Act, 21 Dec. 2005, Act No. 123 § 2 (establishing the Government Pension Fund as an umbrella
entity comprised of the Government Pension Fund-Global, formerly the Petroleum Fund and the
Government Pension Fund-Norway, formerly the National Insurance Scheme. This article focuses only
on the Government Pension Fund-Global (GPFG)).
15. The Report from the Graver Committee, MINISTRY OF FIN., § I (Nov. 7, 2003),
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/tema/statenspensjonsfond/ansvarligeinvesteringer/
graverutvalget/Report-on-ethical-guidelines.html?id=420232 [hereinafter Graver Committee Report];
see also ERIKSEN, supra note 13, at 7-8.
16. Graver Committee Report, supra note 15, § 2.2.
17. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 17-18 (1989) (defining intergenerational
equity is defined as justice between generations).
18. NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN., ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND
IN 2008: REPORT NO. 20 (2008-2009) TO THE STORTING 11 (2009), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2185603/PDFS/STM200820090020000EN PDFS.pdf [hereinafter
GPF REPORT No. 201.
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In terms of benefiting future generations, it is important to focus on
sustainable development and place it in the context of SWFs. Balancing maximum
financial returns with sustainable development is difficult for any profit-making
entity, but SWFs, having a longer investment timeframe, are in a better position to
promote sustainable development. In an effort to address this challenge, the
Norwegian Parliament adopted Ethics Guidelines for the GPFG in 2004,
specifically prohibiting investments that would put the fund at an unacceptable risk
of contributing to serious or systematic human rights violations, severe
environmental damage, and gross corruption,' 9 essentially spelling out the
requirements of sustainable development. After an evaluation process in 2008,
these guidelines were amended in 2010.20
B. Legal and Institutional Framework
While the GPFG was established in 1990, 21 it did not receive any funds until
there was a budget surplus in 1996.22 The government's net cash flow from
petroleum operations is transferred in its entirety to the GPFG through the state
budget, whereas the fiscal guidelines stipulate that only the expected real return on
the fund-four percent of the fund should be returned to the budget for general
spending purposes-hence the real value of the fund itself will be protected.23
The Norwegian State is the official owner of the GPFG, and the Ministry of
Finance manages it on behalf of the Norwegian people. However, in order to have
political backing, major changes to the GPFG's investment strategy are presented
to Parliament before being implemented.2 4 The Ministry of Finance determines the
overall investment strategy for the GPFG, and follows up on its operational
management. 25 The operational management of the GPFG has been delegated to
the Norwegian Central Bank, Norges Bank.26 This role, however, is not a Central
Bank function, and is therefore strictly separated from the Central Bank's other
activities and referred to as the Norges Bank Investment Management ("NBIM"). 2 7
The GPFG is not established as a separate legal entity, but as a deposit account at
the Norges Bank. Norges Bank has a management agreement with the Ministry of
19. See Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion, supra note 5, § 2 (3); NBIM Management
Mandate, supra note 5 (replacing 2004 ethical guidelines); infra note 55 and accompanying text.
20. See Guidelinesfor Observation and Exclusion, supra note 5.
21. The Government Petroleum Fund, 22 June 1990, Act No. 36.
22. Oystein Olsen & Yngvar Tveit, Statens Petroleumsfond-Et Redskap For Langsiktig
Forvaltning Av Oljeformuen, in HVA GJOR OLJEPENGENE MED OSS? [WHAT DOES THE OIL INCOME DO
TO us?] 99, 105 (Ame Jon Isachsen ed., 2002).
23. ERIKSEN, supra note 13, at 6.
24. See, e.g., Larry Catd Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons: The
Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance Through Private Global
Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 425, 453 (2010); GPF REPORT NO. 20, supra note 18, at 11.
25. Backer, supra note 24, at 454.
26. Id. at 455.
27. GPF REPORT NO. 20, supra note 18, at 37.
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Finance specifically delegating the operational authority over the GPFG to the
bank and this agreement is publicly disclosed.28
The GPFG's assets are invested strictly in foreign financial instruments
(thirty-five to forty percent in bonds, sixty percent in equities, and five percent in
real estate), in over seventy developed and emerging markets.2 9 Unlike traditional
pension funds, the GPFG is not earmarked for specific liabilities, but is an
instrument for general savings on the part of the State. 30 Because it has a very long
investment horizon and is not subject to short-term liquidity requirements, the
GPFG has a higher risk-bearing capacity than many comparable funds." As of
2013, the market value of the GPFG is NOK 5,038 billion (approx. U.S. $840
billion).32 Currently, the GPFG is invested in over eight thousand companies and
owns approximately 1.3 percent of global listed shares. 33
The goal for the investment strategy of the fund is to achieve maximum
financial return with moderate risk to help ensure that future generations will be
able to draw the maximum possible benefit from the oil wealth.34  In order to
achieve a maximum financial return, and as a long-term investor, the government
sees its role as being a responsible investor, promoting good corporate governance
and safeguarding environmental and social concerns.35 This applies particularly to
the broadly diversified, economy-wide investor-often referred to as "universal
investor," such as the Norwegian GPFG.36
There is broad political support for the ethical framework for the responsible
management of the GPFG. Being a responsible investor is defined as ensuring
28. Id.; see also Management Mandate for the Government Pension Fund Global, 21. Dec. 2005
No. 123, §§ 2, 7, available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/l719656/gpfg madate 042013.pdf.
29. Investments, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., http://www.nbim.no/en/Investments (last visited
July 20, 2013).
30. GPF REPORT NO. 20, supra note 18, at 12.
31. Id.
32. Market Value, NORGEs BANK INV. MGMT, http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/market-value/
(last updated Mar. 28, 2014); NORGEs BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT (NBIM), GOVERNMENT
PENSION FUND GLOBAL: QUARTERLY REPORT: SECOND QUARTER 2013, at 10 tbl.1-10 (2013),
available at http://www.nbim.no/en/press-and-publications/Reports/2013/quarterly-report-2q-2013
(listing market value of GPFG as 4,397 billion NOK as of June 13, 2013).
33. NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL: ANNUAL REPORT 2013
27 (2014), available at http://www.nbim.no/globalassets/reports/2013/annual-report/annual-
report_2013_web.pdf
34. GPF REPORT NO. 20, supra note 18, at 11-12.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Interview with Anne Kvam, former Head of Corporate Governance, Norges Bank Investment
Management, (July 23, 2008); see NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN., ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE
GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND IN 2009: REPORT NO. 10 (2009-2010) TO THE STORTING 133-36 (2010),
available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2500165/PDFS/STM200920100010000ENPDFS.pdf
[hereinafter GPF REPORT No. 10]. "A universal owner (UO) is defined as an owner with investments
spread across a large number of companies in many industries and countries." Id. at 133; see also
JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: How
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC 3 (2000).
37. GPF REPORT NO. 20, supra note 18, at 12.
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that the GPFG is managed in a way that "promotes better functioning, legitimate
and efficient markets and sustainable development in the broadest sense."38
Promoting sustainable development in economic, environmental, and social terms
is regarded as a precondition for good financial returns over time.39 This goal is in
keeping with the U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment ("U.N. PRI") that the
Ministry of Finance, as formal owner of the GPFG, has signed.4 0 These principles
emphasize that ESG issues can affect the performance of investment portfolios.41
C. Ethics Guidelines
In 2004, based on the work of the Graver Committee, 42 the Norwegian
Parliament debated and then accepted unanimously the Ethics Guidelines for the
GPFG-to better fulfill its ethics obligations for future generations. 43 The Graver
Committee focused on two main ethical obligations: (1) the obligation to ensure
financial returns so that future generations will benefit from the oil wealth
contingent on sustainable development, and (2) the obligation to respect
fundamental rights of those who are affected by the companies in which the Fund
invests.44 These obligations became the premise for the Ethics Guidelines.45
After an in-depth review process in 2008-2009, the Ethical Guidelines of
2004 were replaced on March 1, 2010, adding several new measures to fulfill the
ethical obligations.46 These were mostly procedural with few changes to the
substantive provisions of the guidelines. After consultations, two new sets of
guidelines were adopted by the Ministry of Finance. The first set of guidelines, the
Guidelines for Norges Bank's work on responsible management and active
ownership was integrated into the new regulations on the management of the
GPFG.47 The second set of guidelines was the Guidelines for observation and
exclusion from the GPFGs investment universe, the main focus of this paper.48
These two sets of guidelines constitute the new Ethics Guidelines.49
38. Id.
39. Id. at 13.
40. Id.; see also Signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment, PRINCIPLES FOR
RESPONSIBLE INV., http://www.unpri.org/signatories/signatories (last visited July 20, 2014).
41. See U.N. PRI, supra note 1.
42. Graver Committee Report, supra note 15, § 6 Annex I (describing the committee as a
government appointed committee with a mandate to propose a set of ethics guidelines).
43. NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN., GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL: RESPONSIBLE
INVESTMENT 8-9 (2010), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FlN/brosjyre/2010/spu/english 2010/SPU hefle eng ebook.pdf.
44. Graver Committee Report, supra note 15, § 6.
45. Id.
46. The Council on Ethics for the GPFG, supra note 8; see also GPF REPORT NO. 10, supra note
36, at 93.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 92-93 (The Storting (the Norwegian Parliament) gave its approval to the Government's
plan. See § 3.2 of Recommendation no. 277 (2008-2009) to the Storting).
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The mechanisms used by the GPFG to fulfill these ethical obligations are
active ownership and observation or exclusion of companies. 50  In order to
safeguard the GPFG's financial interests, Norges Bank, through NBIM, is
mandated to exercise active ownership rights for the fund's investments.' The
Council on Ethics makes recommendations on the observation and exclusion of
companies to the Ministry of Finance, which then makes the final decision.52 This
process could give the appearance of such decisions being subject to political
considerations, yet the Ministry emphasizes that it is acting in its capacity as an
investor with the goal of maximizing the long-term real return and that other
political objectives must be pursued by other means, for instance through foreign
affairs or environmental policies. The Ministry of Finance has stated "we risk
losing our credibility as a financial investor if we use the Fund [GPFG] as an
instrument in our foreign policy."53
The exercise of the ownership rights by NBIM is based on the U.N.'s Global
Compact, the OECD Guidelines for Corporate Governance, and the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 54 NBIM's exercise of its ownership
rights in the GPFG are considered active in the sense that the NBIM is an active
shareholder observing standards of corporate governance in the form of
shareholder rights and informal means to influence the corporations' adherence to
the Ethical Guidelines.55 As part of its ownership activities, the NBIM uses several
approaches to influence corporations in its investment portfolio, including
shareholder proposals and voting at annual general meetings, dialogue with
companies, legal action, meeting with regulatory authorities, and collaboration
with other investors. 56 In recent years, the NBIM has also published documents
outlining their social and environmental expectations of companies in which the
GPFG invests in order to strengthen its active ownership effort, the first being on
children's rights, entitled the NBIM's Investor Expectations on Children's
50. Graver Committee Report, supra note 15, § 5.1.
51. NBIM Management Mandate, supra note 5, §§ 2.2-2.3.
52. The Council on Ethics for the GPFG, supra note 8.
53. Hilde Singsaas, Former State Sec'y, Ministry of Fin., Opening Speech at the Responsible
Investment Conference at the Norwegian Business School (BI) (June 20, 2013), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/aktuelt/taler-artikler/taler-ogartikler av ovrigpolitisklede/tal
er-og-artikler-av-hilde-singsaas/2013/opening-speech-at-the-responsible-invest.html?id=73 1193.
54. Graver Committee Report, supra note 15, § 5.1; see ORG. FOR EcON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/oecdguidelinesformultinationalenterprises.htm [hereinafter OECD
GUIDELINES ON MULTINATIONALS].
55. Graver Committee Report, supra note 15, §§ 3.1, 5.1; see also GPF REPORT No. 10, supra
note 36, at 125.
56. GPF REPORT NO. 10, supra note 36, at 125.
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Rights. The NBIM's Investor Expectations on Climate Change Management and
Water Management were soon to follow.
The Council on Ethics, in charge of recommending observation and
exclusion, was established by royal decree in 2004." It has five members and a
secretariat of seven people. 60 The Council on Ethics works with a number of
consultants. 61 Furthermore, it uses software programs to monitor newswires and
other sources for reports or information related to or involving companies in the
GPFG's portfolio in order to flag the worst offenders of the Ethics Guidelines. 62
If a company is involved in the production of weapons that through normal
use violates fundamental humanitarian principles, it is identified through a
negative screening process and excluded from the investment universe (product-
63based exclusion). Furthermore, companies producing tobacco have been added
to the criteria for exclusion. 64 Companies will be excluded from the investment
universe (conduct-based) if there is an unacceptable risk of the GPFG contributing
to or being responsible for:
a) Serious or systematic human rights violations such as murder,
torture, deprivation of liberty, forced labor, the worst forms of
child labor, and other child exploitation;
b) Serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations of war
or conflict;
c) Severe environmental damage;
d) Gross corruption;
e) Other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical
norms.65
57. See Children's Rights, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT.,
http://www.nbim.no/en/responsibility/responisble-investments/childrens-rights (last updated Feb. 27,
2014) (providing link to brochure on NBIM's Investor Expectations on Children's Rights).
58. See Climate Change, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT.,
http://www.nbim.no/en/responsibility/responisble-investments/climate-change (last updated Feb. 27,
2014) (providing link to brochure NBIM's Investor Expectations on Climate Change Management);
Water Management, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., http://www.nbim.no/en/responsibility/responisble-
investments/water-management (last updated Feb. 27, 2014) (providing link to brochure NBIM's
Investor Expectations on Water Management).
59. The Council on Ethics for the GPFG, supra note 8; see also Guidelines for Observation and
Exclusion, supra note 5, §§ 2-5.
60. GPF REPORT No. 20, supra note 18, at 89.
61. REGJERINGEN.No , no. 9 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/styrer-rad-
utvalg/ethics-council/frequently-asked-questions.html?id=605599#OLE LINK 16 (last updated Nov.
30, 2012).
62. Id. no. 16.
63. Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion, supra note 5, § 2(l)(a).
64. Id. § 2(l)(b). This was one outcome of the evaluation process in 2008-2009. Id The criterion
is limited to production of tobacco products, and does not include associated products, such as, filters
and flavor additives, or the sale of tobacco products. Id.
65. Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion, supra note 5, § 2(3).
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The premises for the Ethics Guidelines clearly state that the GPFG's
investment should generate a sound return, contingent on sustainable development,
and not represent an unacceptable risk of complicity in grossly unethical acts,
including the areas of human rights and the environment. Only states can violate
their human rights obligations directly under international law (outside the realm
of international criminal law), yet companies can contribute to human rights
violations committed by states and the GPFG, in turn, may contribute to the
companies' complicity through its ownership. 66 No evidence of contribution needs
to be provided for the GPFG to take action; the presence of an unacceptable risk is
sufficient to trigger a response. This also applies to acts or omissions in regard to
the environment. Only the most serious violations of the ethical standards should
provide a basis for exclusion. The fact that a risk is deemed unacceptable is linked
to the seriousness of the ongoing act, whether a company is accused of several
counts of unethical conduct, and the degree of probability of the act taking place in
the future.68 Past acts alone are not enough for exclusion from the GPFP, yet past
patterns of conduct can be relevant when they indicate future conduct.69 The
Council on Ethics also makes sure that there is factual evidence to support the
accusations leveled at the company.
To date, the Ministry of Finance, based upon recommendations from the
Council on Ethics, has screened out investments in eighteen companies on the
basis of their production of certain kinds of weapons, such as central parts of
nuclear weapons, and involvement in the production of cluster munitions and
landmines." In addition, one company has been excluded for selling military
material to Burma.72 Twenty-one companies have been excluded for tobacco
production. In order to avoid the unacceptable risk of the GPFG contributing to
serious or systematic human rights violations or severe environmental damage,
eighteen companies have been excluded from GPFG.74 Two companies were
excluded on grounds of other particularly gross violations of fundamental ethical
66. COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE Gov'T PENSION FUND-GLOBAL, COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL: ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at 45 (2006), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/l 957930/Arsmelding%202005%20eng.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT 2005].
67. Id.
68. GPF REPORT NO. 10, supra note 36, at 77; see also Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion,
supra note 5, § 2(4).
69. ANNUAL REPORT 2005, supra note 66, at 47-48.
70. GPF REPORT NO. 10, supra note 36, at 77.
71. Companies Excluded from the Investment Universe, MINISTRY OF FIN.,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pension-fund/responsible-
investments/companies-excluded-from-the-investment-u.html?id=447122 (last updated Apr. 9, 2014).
72. Id. (referring to Dongfeng Motor Group Co Ltd. (28 Feb. 2009)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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norms75 and three for serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations of
war or conflict.76
No companies have yet been withdrawn from the investment universe of the
GPFG due to their lack of action to mitigate climate change, under the "severe
environmental damage" criterion under the Guidelines for Observation and
Exclusion. Currently, this criterion does not cover climate change. The NBIM, on
the other hand, has entered into dialogue with companies lobbying against
regulations requiring action to mitigate climate change and has used its voting
rights as a shareholder on climate change resolutions introduced by shareholders at
the general meetings of targeted companies. The NBIM has also communicated its
expectations to companies in regard to addressing climate change, as mentioned
above.
In addition, in 2012, NBIM expanded its climate change focus area to include
deforestation of tropical rainforests as a means of emitting carbon, in addition to its
existing focus on emissions of greenhouse gases through the burning of fossil fuels
as stipulated in its expectation documents.77 Based on that decision, it divested
stocks from twenty-three palm oil companies from GPFG's investment portfolio
determining that they were producing palm oil in an unsustainable manner,
contributing to tropical rainforest deforestation.78
Ill. GPFG's - EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS
The observation and exclusion mechanisms employed by the GPFG to
monitor compliance with the Ethics Guidelines leave open the possibility that
firms found to be in breach of these guidelines can alter their unethical behaviors
and shift their internal practices toward sustainability. Given that unsustainable
practices can lead to divestment and exclusion from the GPFG, corporations face
some incentives to adhere to its Ethics Guidelines; this is especially the case where
corporations may wish to avoid the costs, both material and reputational, of being
75. Id. (Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan (6 Dec. 2011) and Elbit Systems Ltd. (31 Aug.
2009)). For Potash Corporation, see COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE Gov'T PENSION FUND - GLOBAL,
COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL: ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 53
(2011), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1957930/Annual_Report_2011.pdf [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT 2011]. For Elbit Systems, see COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOv'T PENSION FUND-
GLOBAL, COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND - GLOBAL: ANNUAL REPORT
2009, at 26 (Sept. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/I957930/EtikkradetE2009.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT2009].
76. Companies Excluded from the Investment Universe, supra note 71 (Shikun & Binui Ltd. (31
May 2012), Africa Israel Investments (30 Jan. 2014), and Danya Cebus (30 Jan. 2014)).
77. NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL: ANNUAL REPORT 2012,
at 35 (2012), available at http://www.nbim.no/globalassets/reports/2012/annual-report/annual-report-
2012.pdf; see also id. at 19 (deeming some economies' "long-term business model ... unsustainable.").
78. Id. at 35; see also COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE Gov'T PENSION FUND-GLOBAL, COUNCIL
ON ETHICS FOR THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL: ANNUAL REPORT 2012 18, at 66 (2012),
available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1957930/aarsmelding_2012_engelsk.pdf [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT 2012].
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divested and publicly identified as having unethical and unsustainable practices.
Thus, in addition to monitoring compliance with the GPFG's Ethics Guidelines,
through observation and exclusion, the Council on Ethics has the additional effect
of redirecting unsustainable corporate behavior and frequently placing corporations
on more sustainable pathways.
This section provides an empirical analysis of this process; it assesses the
effectiveness of the GPFG in altering corporate behavior once violations of Ethics
Guidelines have been detected. It begins with two case studies of corporations,
Germany-based Siemens AG and U.S.-based FMC Corporation, both of which
have been publicly identified for engaging in unsustainable practices by the
Council on Ethics, and have subsequently addressed these unsustainable behaviors.
Then the section provides a large-N empirical analysis of all firms that have
similarly been identified by the Council on Ethics since 2005.
A. The cases of Siemens and FMC Corporation
In 2007, the GPFG publicly identified the Germany-based multinational
conglomerate Siemens AG as the subject of a Council on Ethics investigation for
gross corruption. In its investigation, the Council on Ethics highlighted instances
where the corporation had actively engaged in corrupt behaviors spanning more
than a decade, including bribing public officials in over twenty-five countries to
win various tenders and to obtain government contracts. 79 At the time of the
investigation, the GPFG held investments worth approximately U.S. $500 million
in Siemens stocks and bonds.80
Siemens undertook immediate efforts to respond to the concerns raised by the
GPFG, providing to the Council on Ethics information about its guidelines relating
to corruption and arguing that compliance with such guidelines had become "a top
,,81priority. In its letter to the Council on Ethics, Siemens further emphasized that
it was "committed to clearing up all misconduct no matter who was responsible,
and will endorse the necessary consequences." 82 Indeed, Siemens' high level of
responsiveness to the Council on Ethics drew acknowledgement in the Council's
annual report.
In 2009, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance placed Siemens on an
"observation list" for a period of four years, during which the Council on Ethics
and NBIM were both tasked with monitoring and reporting on Siemens' efforts to
redress its corrupt practices. During that period, the Council on Ethics continued
79. COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE Gov'T PENSION FUND-GLOBAL, COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL: ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 47 (2008), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/I957930/etikkradet engelskO8.pdf.
80. Id. at 45.
81. Id. at 55.
82. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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to observe Siemens and engaged in direct dialogue with the company to monitor its
efforts at implementing more sustainable business practices. 83
In 2012, Siemens was removed from observation following a report by the
Council on Ethics that emphasized a shift within the corporation toward addressing
and eliminating corrupt practices. The Council on Ethics noted that "it [was]
unlikely that there was a higher risk of corruption in Siemens than in other
comparable companies" and thus recommended that its observation period come to
an end.8 4
This process reveals that efforts undertaken by the GPFG helped facilitate a
change in Siemens' corporate behavior in a more sustainable direction. While
Siemens' corruption was widely publicized and became the subject of a number of
lawsuits, market-based pressure from investors such as the GPFG no doubt
influenced Siemens' decision to implement more sustainable practices over time.
This is corroborated by Siemens' high level of responsiveness to inquiries from the
Council on Ethics.
An additional case further illustrates the ways in which the Council on Ethics
can be successful in motivating companies to engage in more sustainable
behaviors. In 2010, the Council on Ethics recommended to the Ministry of
Finance that it exclude the U.S.-based FMC Corporation for "particularly serious
violations of ethical norms" tied to its practice of purchasing phosphate minerals
mined from the non-self-governing territory of Western Sahara.8 5 The Ministry of
Finance concurred with the Council's recommendation and divested securities
worth some U.S. $50 million the following year.86
During the course of the investigation into alleged unethical practices, FMC
Corporation revealed to the Council on Ethics that it was party to long-term
contracts with Moroccan companies to purchase phosphates from Western Sahara,
and that it intended to continue this practice into the future.87  Indeed, FMC
Corporation notified the Council on Ethics that its operations were in many ways
dependent on access to such phosphates.8 In its Annual Report, the Council notes
that, "FMC Corp[oration] makes it clear that FMC Foret [its Spanish subsidiary]
will continue to buy phosphate from Bou Craa [northern Western Sahara], and that
the company's plant in Huelva, Spain, to a great extent is dependent on access to
83. ANNUAL REPORT 2009, supra note 75, at 5.
84. ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 78, at 6-7.
85. ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 75, at 6-7. FMC Foret's phosphate trade with the state-
owned Moroccan mining company was contrary to the interests of the local population and not for their
benefit. Id. This breach of the Ethics Guidelines fell under the category "other particularly serious
violations of fundamental ethical norms." Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion, supra note 5, §
2(3)(e).
86. ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 75, at 6; Norway Blacklists US/Canadian Fertilizer Firms
over Sahara Imports, WESTERN SAHARA RESOURCE WATCH (June 12, 2011),
http://www.wsrw.org/al05x2177.
87. ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 75, at 57-58.
88. Id. at 58.
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phosphate of the quality found at Bou Craa." 89 The Council on Ethics regarded
this information as an assurance that FMC Corporation intended to continue
engaging in what it considered to be grossly unethical behavior; this information
formed the basis of the Council's decision to recommend exclusion.90
Following FMC Corporation's exclusion from the GPFG, the Council on
Ethics continued to contact the corporation to determine whether it continued to
purchase phosphates mined from Western Sahara.91 This practice is established in
Paragraph 5 of the GPFG's Ethics Guidelines, which directs the Council on Ethics
to "routinely assess whether the basis for exclusion still exists and may, in light of
new information, recommend that the Ministry of Finance reverse an exclusion
ruling."92 In August 2012, FMC Corporation notified the Council on Ethics that it
had ceased purchasing phosphates from Western Sahara. Notably, the company
also stated that it had no "plans or agreements that include future purchases of
phosphates from Western Sahara." 93 This marked a significant shift in behavior
for FMC Corporation, which had purchased phosphates extracted from Western
Sahara for some forty years. 94 In light of this information, the Council on Ethics
recommended to the Ministry of Finance that FMC Corporation's exclusion be
reversed.95 The Ministry of Finance accepted the recommendation, and FMC
Corporation subsequently reappeared in NBIM's investment portfolio. 9 6
The above cases illustrate the ways in which the Council on Ethics' screening
and exclusion mechanisms can have the effect of redirecting unethical behaviors.
Both Siemens AG and FMC Corporation were highly responsive to the Council on
Ethics and eventually redressed their unethical practices in ways that placed each
firm on a more sustainable pathway. These shifts in corporate behavior are
attributable to investor-side concerns over long-term sustainability. The remainder
of this section turns to a larger quantitative test of these mechanisms to evaluate
their ability to motivate firms to change unethical behavior.
B. Influencing corporate behavior
We propose that the ability of the GPFG to influence corporate behavior
toward more sustainable practices is tied to the degree of market leverage it
possesses over a given corporation. We argue that the magnitude of this leverage,
in turn, is a reflection of the relative size of the investment the GPFG maintains in
a given corporation. Larger relative investments lead to more leverage because
they magnify the consequences of observation and potential exclusion when the
Council on Ethics identifies companies for unethical practices. We thus conduct
89. Id.
90. Id. at 58, 62.
91. ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 78, at 50.
92. Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion, supra note 5, § 5(5).
93. ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 78, at 50-51.
94. ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 75, at 57.
95. ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 78, at 51.
96. Id. at 6-7.
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an empirical test that models the likelihood of a corporation altering its unethical
behavior as a function of the relative size of investment the GPFG maintains in that
firm. We hypothesize that larger relative investments are more likely to influence
corporate behavior in a direction toward more sustainable practices than smaller
relative investments.
1. Sample
The high level of transparency within the GPFG permits us to test our
hypothesis on all corporations that have been publicly identified as subjects of
investigation by the Council on Ethics, as well as all corporations that have been
negatively screened for unethical practices. These are firms such as Siemens AG
and FMC Corporation that have been investigated for engaging in unethical
behavior by the Council on Ethics. In the process of being investigated, these
companies have the option to alter their practices to bring them into alignment with
Ethics Guidelines before they are excluded from the fund. There are seventy-nine
such corporations that appear in our sample.9 7
2. Variables
Our Dependent Variable ("DV") is a dichotomous measure that captures
whether a corporation changes its unethical practice following an investigation by
the Council on Ethics. If the corporation alters its behavior, it is coded as a one. If
a corporation is investigated for unethical practices and is subsequently divested
and never alters its behavior, it is coded as a zero.
Our primary independent variable ("IV") is designed to capture the degree of
market leverage the GPFG maintains over a target firm. It measures the
percentage of outstanding shares of a firm that are owned by the GPFG. We
calculate this variable by dividing the value of the GPFG's investment in the firm
in Norwegian Kroner ("NOK") by the value of the corporation's total outstanding
shares in NOK. All figures are calculated based on values taken from the year the
corporation was publicly revealed as the subject of investigation. The minimum
percent ownership in the sample is zero, while the maximum percent ownership is
2.07 percent of total outstanding shares. In cases where the percent ownership of a
corporation is zero, the GPFG has typically engaged in negative screening, and has
never owned shares in that corporation. These data are publicly available from
NBIM's annual reports. 98
We also include a number of control variables ("CV") in our analysis. Our
first CV is the size of a corporation by market capitalization the year it was
97. Information on each of these corporations was compiled from the Council on Ethics' annual
reports for years 2005 to 2013. See Annual Reports, REGJERINGEN.NO,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/styrer-rad-utvalg/ethics council/annual-reports.html?id=458699 (last
visited July 20, 2014).
98. Reports, NORGEs BANK INV. MGMT, http://www.nbim.no/en/transparency/reports/ (last
updated Feb. 27, 2014).
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identified as the subject of investigation by the GPFG. Market capitalization is
presented for all corporations in NOK, even if that corporation's shares and bonds
are traded in a currency other than NOK. We include this control under the
assumption that the size of a corporation may influence its likelihood of altering an
unsustainable behavior. For example, large firms may be less wary of the costs of
divestment and thus less sensitive to any market leverage exerted by the GPFG.
Conversely, large firms may be more sensitive to the reputation costs of being
identified as the subject of investigation for unethical behaviors; in such cases,
these firms may be more likely to alter an unethical behavior.
Our second CV measures the level of democracy of the country within which
the firm is chartered, or the state within which the violation of the Ethics
Guidelines occurred where that country is different. For example, Wal-Mart USA,
which appears in the sample for violations of human rights, is coded based on the
level of democracy in the United States, while Wal-Mart de Mexico is coded based
on the level of democracy in Mexico. To measure the level of democracy, we use
the 21-point "Polity Score" scale, where states with the lowest level of democracy
are coded as -10 and states with the highest level are coded as 10.9 We include
this control under the assumption that corporations in more democratic countries
may be more receptive to efforts at incorporating sustainable practices than
corporations from less democratic countries.
Our third CV is a dichotomous measure indicating whether a firm has been
negatively screened or investigated for the production of munitions. This category
of companies represents a uniquely difficult set of cases for the Council on Ethics.
For most of these companies, weapons production is a core business function. It is
therefore less likely that these firms will cease the production of munitions to align
their behavior with the GPFG's Ethics Guidelines. This is especially the case
when compared with other types of unethical behaviors, like corruption or
environmental degradation, which companies may be more willing to address
insofar as they do not constitute a central function of the business.
A similar logic motivates the inclusion of our final CV, which indicates
whether a corporation produces tobacco. While tobacco-producing firms have the
opportunity to alter their unethical behaviors, none to date have. 0  This is
unsurprising, as implementing sustainable practices for these corporations would
imply abandoning tobacco production altogether. There are eighteen tobacco-
producing firms that have been excluded from the GPFG. The dummy measuring
tobacco production predicts a perfect rate of corporations failing to alter their
unsustainable behaviors; it thus has the statistical effect of dropping these
observations from the sample. Notably, this accounts for the drop in the number of
observations used to estimate our model.
99. Monty G. Marshall & Ted Robert Gurr, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics
and Transitions, 1800-2012, CENTER FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (last updated June 10, 2013).
100. See Annual Reports, supra note 97.
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3. Case Selection
Testing our hypothesis on this sample raises the potential for selection bias. If
the Council on Ethics systematically investigates corporations that are more likely
a priori to alter their unethical practices, then only these corporations will select
into our sample, while corporations that are less likely to alter unethical practices
will be excluded. This selection problem threatens to undermine the
generalizability of our results. The obvious econometric solution, a two-stage
Heckman selection model,' 1 is infeasible due to the exclusion restriction requiring
us to identify some instrument that predicts whether a corporation will select into
an investigation for unsustainable practices.
While we cannot model any selection bias, we can determine whether there is
anything systematically different about firms that select into Council on Ethics
investigations from those that do not. To determine whether there is anything
substantively different about companies that select into our sample from
companies that do not, we take two random draws of seventy-nine corporations
from the GPFG's investment universe. This is equivalent to the number of
corporations in our sample. For each randomly drawn firm, we calculate the
percent of total outstanding shares controlled by the GPFG. We then perform
difference-in-mean tests (two-tailed) to determine whether there is a statistically
significant difference across means for firms that select into our sample and the
firms that do not. If there is no sample selection bias, there should be no
statistically significant difference in means between the corporations in our sample
and the corporations randomly drawn in terms of the percent of shares owned by
the GPFG.
The results of the difference-in-means tests reveal no significant differences
(at ninety percent confidence) between the mean percentages of outstanding shares
controlled by the GPFG for corporations that select into our sample.' 02 There is
thus nothing systematically different about firms that select into our sample versus
those that do not in terms of the relative slice of shares controlled. This suggests
that the Council on Ethics does not choose corporations that it believes will be a
priori more amenable to implementing more sustainable practices, while failing to
investigate firms that will be less willing to address its concerns.
We test our hypothesis using logistic regression; our model is laid out in
equation form below: 0 3
101. James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error, 47 ECONOMETRICA 153
(1979). The Heckman selection model is a common method for correcting parameter estimates that are
biased due to sample selection effects. See id.
102. For the first random draw, t(79)=1.2406, p-0.1096; for the second random draw,
t(79)= 1.2407, p=0.1096.
103. The beta coefficients represent the parameters estimated by maximizing the likelihood
function associated with the equation we present. These coefficients, in turn, allow us to use data
simulations to calculate the probability of a company changing its unethical behavior following
negative screening or exclusion.
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Logit (Firm compliance) = /0 + /31 * Percent Firm Control
+ /2 * Firm Size
+ /3 * Democracy
+ #4 * Weapons
+ /5 * Tobacco
4. Results
The results (presented in Table 1) provide support for our hypothesis that the
likelihood of a corporation changing an unethical behavior increases as the relative
size of the GPFG's investment in that corporation increases. This suggests that
corporations tend to be more receptive to investors' efforts at implementing
sustainable practices as the relative size of the investment increases. Notably, it
only requires small relative increases in investment size for companies to change
their practices. In other words, small relative increases in investment share yield
disproportionate increases in the probability of a corporation changing its behavior.
This also suggests that, under certain circumstances, corporations can be highly
sensitive to the expectations of investors with regard to sustainable practices, even
when those investors own only small relative slices of a corporation's tradable
securities.
For example, based on simulations (presented in Table 2), the model predicts
a forty-one percent likelihood of a firm abandoning an unethical practice following
negative screening or an investigation when the GPFG controls zero shares. This
low likelihood is perhaps unsurprising given that the GPFG maintains almost no
market leverage over such firms. However, when the GPFG controls a quarter of
one percent of outstanding shares in a firm, the probability of that firm changing an
unethical behavior rises to 0.52. Stated differently, there is about a fifty percent
chance that a firm will change its behavior when investigated or negatively
screened when the GPFG controls 0.25 of the total outstanding shares of that firm.
The likelihood of observing a change increases substantially to 0.71 when the
GPFG controls as much as 0.75 percent of outstanding shares in a corporation.
When this increases to one percent, the likelihood of a firm changing some
unethical behavior further increases to 0.78. The pattern is consistent throughout
simulations as the percent of shares controlled rises; indeed, the model predicts a
ninty percent chance that a corporation will discontinue an unethical behavior
when the GPFG controls 1.75 percent of outstanding shares. This again suggests
that only small relative increases in the amount of securities controlled by investors
has the ability to magnify substantially market leverage in terms of convincing
corporations to adopt more sustainable practices.
The size of a corporation by market capitalization has a weakly significant
relationship (p<0.10) to the likelihood of that corporation altering its behavior
following investigation or negative screening from the Council on Ethics. While
the relationship is not significant at conventional thresholds, it is notable that the
relationship is positive, suggesting that larger companies may be more likely to
change their behavior than smaller companies. This could indicate that larger
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companies may be more sensitive to investor interests related to sustainable
practices.
As expected, the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating whether a
company engages in weapons production is significant and signed negatively; this
demonstrates that companies engaged in weapons production are indeed less likely
to alter their unethical practices than are companies that are investigated or
screened for violations in other areas. Indeed, the model predicts only a thirty-two
percent likelihood of such a company changing its behavior following negative
screening or an investigation when the GPFG controls one percent of total
outstanding shares. When the relative slice of control doubles to two percent, the
model predicts only a sixty-four percent likelihood of a firm changing its behavior.
Substantively, this suggests that it is more difficult to wield market leverage over
weapons manufacturers in an effort to implement more sustainable practices.
Last, the level of democracy of the country in which a given firm is located
bears no significant relationship to the likelihood of that company changing some
unethical behavior. In other words, companies in highly democratic countries are
no more (or less) likely to change their behavior than are companies in
undemocratic countries. This null result is perhaps heartening for investors who
may wish to target companies in undemocratic countries, as they appear to be just
as receptive to implementing sustainable practices as companies chartered in
countries that are highly democratic. Substantively, this result suggests that the
location of a company bears little relationship to its receptiveness to investor
pressures over implementing more sustainable practices. Market leverage appears
to have the same effect on firms, whether they're chartered in democratic countries
or otherwise.
Table 1: Explaining Changes in
Corporate Behavior
Percent Shares Owned 1.741*
(0.857)
Firm Size 2.510Ovs
(1.420)
Democracy 0.553
(9.143)
Weapons -2.279*
(0.867)
Constant -0.524
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Pseudo R2
Percent Predicted Correctly
N
* p<0.05, WS p50.10; robust
standard errors reported in
parentheses, two-tailed tests.
Table 2: Predicted Probability of a
Firm Changing its Behavior at
Levels of Percent Firm Ownership
Percent
Ownership
0
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
Likelihood
Change
0.41
0.52
0.62
0.71
0.78
0.84
0.87
0.90
0.92
(0.874)
0.243
67.92
53
Confidence
Interval
0.20-0.65
0.33-0.70
0.44-0.77
0.51-0.87
0.54-0.93
0.57-0.97
0.58-0.99
0.59-0.99
0.60-0.99
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* Estimated using CLARIFY104; firm size and
democracy are held at their mean values, while
weapons production is held at its mode.
IV. THE SUSTAINABLE PATHWAY-GPFG AS A MODEL FOR OTHER INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS
The GPFG has been referred to as the "gold standard of sovereign wealth
funds" by the President of the European Commission.'05 The GPFG is also listed
among the most transparent of the SWFs, with a rating of ten, the highest score on
the Lindaburg-Maduell Transparency Index.' 06  This rating is based on several
factors, including: whether the fund discloses its "history including reasons for its
creation, origins of wealth, and government ownership structure"; whether the fund
provides "up-to-date independently audited annual reports," and its ownership
stakes in companies, and provides guidelines with regard to "ethical standards,
investment policies, and enforcement of guidelines." 0 7
Measured against the U.N. PRI, and considering its most recent revisions, the
GPFG is a workable model for other institutional investors. Now that it has
brought environment and climate change to the forefront, it is more likely to take
ESG issues into account in a broader fashion. The exclusion mechanism is a long,
time-consuming process which some may claim is not necessary if investors take
ESG issues into account in a more holistic manner in their investment decision-
making. However, as with all voluntary approaches, they will only be as effective
as the reliability of the self-reporting mechanisms. Having an exclusion
mechanism available can indeed be very effective, as we have shown, and should
remain as a 'stick'. The best approach is to address ESG issues at all levels,
having both investors and companies integrating ESG issues into their decision-
making process. States should be encouraged (or assisted) to adopt practical
legislation addressing ESG issues.
Currently, there are few globally accepted best practice standards for SWFs
regarding taking ESG issues into account.0 s The Norwegian Ministry of Finance
considers the U.N. PRI an important initiative because it "combines the need for a
104. MICHAEL TOMZ, JASON WITTENBERG & GARY KING, CLARIFY: SOFTWARE FOR
INTERPRETING AND PRESENTING STATISTICAL RESULTS (Version 2.0 2003),
http://scholar.harvard.edu/gking/clarify.
105. Jose Manuel Barroso, President, Eur. Comm'n, Sovereign Wealth Funds: No European
Legislation but Rather a Common Approach (Feb. 25, 2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2004-2009/president/pdf/statement 20080225 02_en.pdf.
106. Carl Linaburg & Michael Maduell, Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, SWF INST.,
http://www.swfinstitute.org/statistics-research/linaburg-maduell-transparency-index/ (last visited July
20, 2014).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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common platform and understanding of the issues and the need for a certain
amount of flexibility in execution on the part of the individual investor."'0 9
The work of the GPFG may itself form the basis of a new global best practice
standard. Actions taken by the GPFG may have a wider multiplier effect,
prompting responsible investment not just by other SWFs, but also private sector
institutional investors."i0 There seems to be a growing preference toward engaging
with companies rather than excluding them. However, there is a dilemma in "the
paradox of the opportunity to positively influence a company by being an active
shareholder, while inherently supporting their irresponsible practices by being an
investor.""' The NBIM Investor Expectations on Climate Change Management is
a promising tool, since it is followed up with an annual compliance report,
assessing whether the companies the GPFG is invested in are meeting the NBIM's
expectations. Thereby, the Norwegian GPFG could be viewed as a leader in the
industry and with some tweaking be a model of best practice.
Regarding the GPFG, the Ethics Guidelines can be an effective tool to
influence corporate behavior, especially the observation and exclusion
mechanisms. In addition, the NBIM's environment-related active equity mandates
should help promote sustainable companies ahead of others in the investment
universe. Furthermore, the NBIM's Investor Expectations on Children's Rights,
Water Management, and Climate Change Management and their respective annual
assessment reports will lead to more dialogue between the NBIM and reluctant
companies that are part of the investment portfolio of the GPFG, encouraging them
to get on a more sustainable path.
V. REFORM PROPOSALS
The Strategy Council for the Government Pension Fund Global, established in
the spring of 2013, with a mandate to strengthen the work of the GPFG on
responsible investment,"l 2 delivered its report, the Responsible Investment and the
Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, to the Ministry of Finance on
November 11, 2013."
The report of the Strategy Council recommends that an outline for a
responsible investment framework should be set out for the GPFG. It would
include its motivation, mandate, principles, strategies, and evaluation.114
Furthermore, it recommends consistency among the GPFG's objectives, priorities,
109. GPF REPORT No. 10, supra note 36, at 131.
110. Bent Sofus Tranoy, Flexible Adjustment in the Age of Financialisation: The Case of Norway,
14 GEOPOLITIcs 360, 360-61 (2009).
111. Sarah Takaki, Stakeholder Perspectives on Norwegian Investment Responsibility, 12 J. INV.
MGMT. 20, 25-26 (2014) (referencing the acknowledgement made by Mr. Hermstad at the Responsible
Investment Conference in Oslo on 20 June 2013).
112. See The Council on Ethics for the GPFG, supra note 8 that requires the Council of Ethics to
ensure the GPFG's investments comply with the ethical guidelines.
113. DIMSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 4, 31.
114. Id. at 17.
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and activities in the responsible investment framework. In addition, it emphasizes
more transparency and accountability. Based on these recommendations, the
Strategy Council sees a need to integrate all the responsible investment activities of
the fund into NBIM, giving the Board of Norges Bank the final say on divestment
decisions, rather than the Ministry of Finance as it is today." 5
The objective of the GPFG's responsible investment strategy, originally set
out by the Graver Committee, has broad political support." 6 More transparency
and accountability has already been called for by several NGOs." 7 The main issue
being debated about the report is its recommendation calling for the integration of
the resources and competence of the Council on Ethics into NBIM. The authors
strongly disagree with this recommendation, as will be explained below in the
context of the effectiveness of the implementation of the Ethics Guidelines.
The exclusion mechanism the Council on Ethics uses when it makes its
recommendations to the Ministry of Finance at the outset of the investment
process, eliminating producers of unethical products from the investment portfolio,
has been very effective."' Indeed, some manufacturers have been eager to inform
the GPFG if they have stopped producing some products to again be able to be
included in the GPFG's portfolio." 9
In addition, the mechanism to place companies under observation or exclude
them from the investment portfolio if there is an unacceptable risk that the
company contributes to unethical behavior, seems, as the authors' empirical
analysis has demonstrated, to work well as a tool to encourage companies to move
toward sustainable development.' 20 Yet, several suggestions have been made for
improvements, among them, giving the Council on Ethics more autonomy.121
This, however, is contrary to the Strategy Council's recommendation to integrate
the Council on Ethics into NBIM. Keeping the Council on Ethics separate from
NBIM is very important because it allows the Council to focus purely on ethical
115. Id. at 30.
116. See supra text accompanying note 37.
117. See ANITA HASLIE & JOAKIM HAMMERLIN, ENDRINGER I DEN ETISKE FORVALTNINGEN AV
STATENS PENSJONSFOND UTLAND, [CHANGES IN THE ETHICS MANAGEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
PENSION FUND GLOBAL] 11, (2013), available at http://www.fivas.org/sider/tekst.asp?side=723
[hereinafter HASLIE REPORT].
I18. Originally called the negative screening process. See DIMSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 5.
119. ETIKKRADET, RECOMMENDATION To REVOKE THE EXCLUSION OF THE COMPANIES BAE
SYSTEMS
PLC. AND FINMECCANICA S.P.A. FROM THE INVESTMENT UNIVERSE OF THE GOVERNMENT PENSION
FUND GLOBAL 1 (2012) (unofficial translation), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FlN/etikk/2013/bae-finmec eng.pdf (BAE Systems plc wrote to the
Ethics Council 10 days before they received the routine enquiry from the Council asking if MBDA-a
company which BAE Systems plc through a joint venture, had a controlling interest in-was still
involved in the production of nuclear weapons. BAE Systems plc stated that MBDA's production of
ASMP-A had now been completed, thus the basis for the exclusion of MBDA's owners no longer
applied.).
120. For example Siemens and FMC Corporation made changes. See discussion supra Part IIl.a.
121. SHAMMAS, supra note 7, at 4.
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issues without being distracted by the financial implications of its
recommendations.122 As long as sustainable development is not given priority over
financial issues, the controlling function of the Council on Ethics should be upheld
in an independent entity accountable only to the Ministry of Finance, since it
represents the owners, the people of Norway. The Council is, in fact, evolving into
a quasi-judicial entity in making its recommendations to the Ministry. 123 As
Backer explains, the work of the Council on Ethics has "the beginnings of a
coherent jurisprudence of ethics for corporate investment, utilizing public power to
influence private governance among enterprises."l 24  This value should not be
underestimated as it has, as stated above, been followed closely by other pension
funds that have, in turn, also excluded the same companies from their investment
portfolio.
More autonomy for the Council on Ethics would make sense in some
circumstances. Giving the Council on Ethics greater say in exclusion cases, rather
than just making recommendations to the Ministry of Finance, would keep the
decision further away from politics whose influence has been criticized by some
commentators.125 Then the Council on Ethics would have to acquire authority over
NBIM regarding ethics issues. This is not compatible with the GPFG's current
structure, which means NBIM's mandate from the Ministry of Finance would need
to be amended. The Council on Ethics could have a final say in the
straightforward exclusion cases and in problematic cases, a recommendation to the
Ministry of Finance could be either accepted or turned down within a deadline of
six months by the Ministry, without second-guessing the Council on Ethics'
thorough analysis. 126 In recent cases, the Ministry has used more than a year to
decide whether to accept some of the Council on Ethics' recommendations, often
leading to the information used in the Council's investigation being outdated as
was also stated in the Strategy Council's report.' 27
The Strategy Council has stated that with the current structure there are "risks
of litigation from companies and other shareholders."' 28 However, this has not
happened to date for the simple reason that "whether or not to invest in a company
is a matter of free choice", as the Graver Committee expressed it in its report in
122. See Magnus Borgen, Frarder 6 la oljefondets Etikkrid bli en del av Norges Bank [Advise
Against Letting the Oil Fund Council on Ethic Become a Part of Norges Bank], BELLONA (Nov. 12,
2013), http://bellona.no/nyheter/klima/2013-1 1-frarader-la-oljefondets-etikkrad-bli-en-del-av-norges-
bank (last visited July 20, 2014).
123. Backer, supra note 6, at 24.
124. Id. at 50.
125. See SHAMMAS, supra note 7, at 9.
126. Kristoffer Ronneberg, For trege medetikk-beslutninger [Too Slow with the Ethics Decisions],
AFTENPOSTEN (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.aftenposten.no/oljefondet/For-tregemed-
etikk-beslutninger-6785594.html#.UhMK3RbvzJ (citing Ola Mestad the head of the Council on Ethics);
see HASLIE REPORT, supra note 117, at 16-17.
127. DIMSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 23.
128. Id.
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2003.129 There is no public hearing or appeals process regarding an exclusion
decision because it is not a legal process. It is an investor making a decision to sell
because it is not happy with its investment. That happens all the time in the market
place for whatever reason-it is a matter of "free choice."13 0 Yet, the Council on
Ethics does give the companies a chance to respond to the allegation of potential
unethical behavior.' 3 ' In addition, all exclusions are reviewed annually to
determine if any of the excluded companies can return to the GPFG's portfolio and
there is a move towards engaging more with companies rather than excluding
them. However, this system only works if there is a 'stick' in the background to
keep everyone focused on the consequences for not cooperating. If the Ethics
Guidelines were to become legal requirements, then the Council on Ethics, which
is not a legal tribunal, would have to adopt a standard litigation process, including
due process rules, to avoid undermining the legitimacy of the Fund in global
markets.132
The exercising of ownership rights is growing in popularity among investors.
Employing environmental-related investment mandates is also growing in use.
Yet, sixty percent of companies still do not consider ESG issues important." The
standard dilemma is weighing the financial returns against the ethical expectations,
which the Strategy Council has deftly expounded upon in its report.14 Yet, the
Norwegian people through their Parliament agreed to focus on ethics when they
established the Ethics Guidelines. That was a political decision. The investment
managers do not have the authority to make decisions on ethics, they have the
expertise when it comes to analyzing the risks involved, but they cannot decide
which risks are the right ones to take.'" 5 NBIM's department dealing with active
ownership policy has the mandate to weigh the Ethics Guidelines up against the
financial interests, while the Council on Ethics focuses only on the ethics.
Obviously, this department, being quite small and definitely not the main focus of
the NBIM is going to have a challenge in fulfilling its mandate. Support and
guidance from the Council on Ethics could strengthen their position.
Many observers have suggested expanding the focus areas for NBIM in its
active ownership and divestment policies to coincide more with the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.' 3 6 Some argue that investor expectations
129. Graver Committee Report, supra note 15, § 2.2.
130. Id.
131. ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 75, at 9.
132. SIMON CHESTERMAN, ALBRIGHT GROUP LLC, ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF
ARTICLES 3 AND 4 OF THE ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL 27-28
(2008), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Vedlegg/aff/Albright GroupEthical Guidelines.pdf.
133. Towner, supra note 3, at 40.
134. DIMSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 5.
135. Martin Skancke, Ny strategi bar legges p6 is [New Strategy Should be Left on Ice], DAGENS
NERINGSLIV, Nov. 13, 2013, at 3.
136. See OECD GUIDELINES ON MULTINATIONALS, supra note 54, at 13-16.
2014 413
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
should include human rights in general, not just children's rights."' Other
environment and social issues should also be given their own investor
expectations. The current investor expectations, which include children's rights,
climate change, and water management, are quite disparate issues, seemingly
random. One could base the investor expectations on, for instance, gradually
introducing the major areas addressed in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, prioritizing companies for assessment when they present a significant
risk of actual or potential adverse environmental or social impacts.' 3 8 Increased
transparency by stipulating which criteria are used to choose which issues are to be
included in the investor expectations, as the Strategy Council has suggested, and
making them available to the public would likely add to the legitimacy of NBIM
and allow the owners of the GPFG, the Norwegian people, to better hold it to
account. 39
Suggestions have also been made for NBIM to publish information regarding
its dialogues with companies following up on its active ownership.14 0 The list of
top scorers on compliance reporting with regard to investor expectations on
children's rights, climate change and water management is all very well, but does
not encourage accountability by measuring how effective these mechanisms are.141
Compare this to the Council on Ethics that publishes all its recommendations on
exclusions made to the Ministry of Finance, which our empirical analysis has
shown to be effective. 142
Rather than integrating the resources and competence of the Council on
Ethics into the Norges Bank, the Council on Ethics should become more
autonomous and NBIM itself should beef up its active ownership and be
accountable to the Council on Ethics for its work in that area. As long as the
Council on Ethics and NBIM cooperate, then there is less chance of overlap. What
is needed is more funding in the ethics area. The cost of the work of the Council
on Ethics and NBIM on active ownership is a very small fraction of what is used
by the investment managers (internal and external managers). These managers
should also become more sensitive to ESG issues in their investment practices.
Currently, positive screening (environmental investments) amounts to a very small
fraction of the value of the GPFG portfolio;' 43 it needs to be substantially increased
137. Interview with Hans Petter Graver, University of Oslo, Norway (Aug. 20, 2013).
138. See POSCO CASE, supra note 11, at 47.
139. DIMSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 27.
140. See HASLIE REPORT, supra note 117, at 22; SHAMMAS, supra note 7, at 11 for an explanation
of how the Swedish national pension fund, AP, enters into dialogue with the companies it invests in.
141. HASLIE REPORT, supra note 117, at 19.
142. See Gunnell E. Sandanger & Arild Hermstad, Slik blir oljefondet best i klassen [That's How
the Oil Fund Becomes Best-in-Class], ENERGI OG KLIMA (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://energiogklima.no/kommentar-analyse/slik-blir-oljefondet-best-i-klassen.
143. It was projected that only NOK 20 billion (less than 1% of the value of GPFG's portfolio)
would be invested between 2010 and 2015. GPF REPORT NO. 20, supra note 18, at 27; see also
BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABILITY:
INSIGHTS FROM NORWAY AND NEW ZEALAND, NORDIC J. OF COM. L., no. 2,2011, at 1, 24-25.
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and over time will show much bigger returns as the market receives the signals that
the green economy is our only choice for the future. If Norway is serious about
promoting sustainable development, then it has to bear that short-term cost.
However, as a universal investor, this short-term cost is not as great as the long-
term cost of reneging on responsible investment since that is more likely to have a
material effect on portfolio risk and performance.'4
Finally, a much debated theme is divesting from fossil fuel investments
entirely (or at least coal and oil sands). The GPFG, the entity that was supposed to
leverage against shifts in oil prices to safeguard the stability of the mainland
economy, is now giving up that function, since according to the HSBC report, oil
stocks will go down in value due to action taken to address climate change.145
Furthermore, if the long-term perspective on sustainable development is taken, it is
clear that the goal of staying below the two degree Celsius increase in temperature
will not be reached if most of the fossil fuels are not left in the ground. This, of
course, reflects the oxymoronic situation that the income of the GPFG is based on
the exploitation of oil and gas. Just as other SWFs accumulate income from other
natural resources, Norway should aim to gradually shift from oil and gas to
renewable energy. A first step would be amend the Ethics Guidelines to add
exploitation of coal and oil sands to the list of products excluded from the GPFG
portfolio as has been suggested from several quarters.146
VI. CONCLUSION
The Albright Group and Simon Chesterman, who were hired by the
Norwegian Ministry of Finance to evaluate the Ethics Guidelines of the GPFG in
2008, stated that "[t]he work done by NBIM and the Council [on Ethics] has
established Norway as a leader on ethical issues in the global economy, in
particular through NBIM's work on child labour and the Council's practice of
publishing thorough opinions." 47 Our analysis corroborates the opinion of the
Albright Group; we show that the Council on Ethics is highly effective in certain
cases at motivating changes in corporate behavior in ways that put the companies
in the GPFG's investment portfolio on a path to sustainability. Though we agree
with the Strategy Council's report of 2013 that coherence and transparency in the
context of the GPFG are important, we strongly disagree with its recommendation
of integrating the Council on Ethics' function into NBIM.
144. See definition of universal investor supra note 36.
145. Will Nichols, HSBC: BP, Shell, Statoil at Risk From 'Unburnable' Reserves, GREENBIZ.COM
(Jan. 29, 2003),
http://www.greenbiz.com/news/2013/01/30/bp-shell-statoli-risk-unbumable-reserves.
146. CATHRINE HAMBRO & NORWEGIAN CLIMATE FOUND., ER OLJEFONDETS
TJERESANDINVESTERINGER ULOVLIGE? [ARE THE OIL FUND'S TAR SAND INVESTMENTS ILLEGAL?] 12-
13 (2013), available at http://klimastiftelsen.no/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Oljefondet-tjaeresand-
rapport-NK2-2013.pdf.
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Strengthening responsible investment by giving more autonomy to the
Council on Ethics, and beefing up the transparency of NBIM and expanding its
focus areas to correspond more closely with the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, will place the Norwegian SWF in a position to be an
even better model of a responsible investor. This, in turn, should encourage
corporations to take ESG issues into account in their activities.
